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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
A jury found forty-one-year-old Dwayne A. Bradley guilty of felony trafficking in 
methamphetamine. The district court imposed a unified sentence of twelve years, with 
three years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Bradley asserts that the district court abused its 
discretion when it admitted certain audio recordings into evidence, or alternatively that it 
abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a new trial because it erred deciding 
a question of law arising during the course of the trial, when it admitted the recordings 
into evidence. Mr. Bradley also asserts that the district court erred when it denied his 
motion for judgment of acquittal, because the evidence presented to the jury was 
insufficient to convict him of trafficking in methamphetamine. Additionally, Mr. Bradley 
asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his unified sentence 
of twelve years, with three years fixed, because the indeterminate portion of the 
sentence is excessive. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging that Mr. Bradley had committed the 
crime of trafficking in methamphetamine, felony, in violation of Idaho Code § 37-
2732B(a)(4). (R., pp.24-25.) After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate found probable 
cause and bound Mr. Bradley over to the district court. (R., p.62.) The State then filed 
an Information charging Mr. Bradley with the above offense. (R., pp.63-64.) He entered 
a not guilty plea. (R., pp.69-70.) 
The case proceeded to a jury trial. (R., pp.122-30, 135-39.) After the opening 
statements, the district court granted the State's motion to amend the Information. 
1 
(Tr., L.8.)1 The Amended Information Mr. Bradley with 
trafficking in methamphetamine, through knowingly possessing methamphetamine in an 
amount represented to be 28 grams or more. (R., pp.133-34.) The district court 
granted the motion to amend the Information because the amendment clarified the 
State's theory of the case that Mr. Bradley represented that the weight was 28 grams or 
more. (See Tr., p.95, Ls.15-24, p.96, L.14-p.97, L.8.) 
During the trial, Sergeant Eric Hildebrandt with the Kootenai County Sheriff's 
Office testified that, after Robert Wyman was arrested for possession of 
methamphetamine with the intent to distribute, he instructed Mr. Wyman to call "Cecil." 
(Tr., p. 98, L.15 p.99, L.4, p.107, L.5 p.108, L.9.) "Cecil" was the name by which 
Mr. Wyman knew Mr. Bradley. (Tr., p.108, Ls.9-10.) Sergeant Hildebrandt testified that 
Mr. Wyman made the call from an interview room at the Kootenai County Sheriff's 
Office, that he was there the entire time Mr. Wyman was speaking, and that he recorded 
the call. (Tr., p.108, L.11 - p.109, L.7.) About half an hour to forty-five minutes later, a 
second call was made. (Tr., p.110, Ls.4-8.) Sergeant Hildebrandt also recorded the 
second call from the same interview room. (Tr., p.110, Ls.9-15.) 
Additionally, Sergeant Hildebrandt testified during his direct examination that, 
when drug deals are arranged over the telephone, in lieu of plain English the 
participants often use "different words to cover what it is they are doing." (Tr., p.102, 
Ls.7-11.) According to Sergeant Hildebrandt's testimony, "If they want a full ounce, it 
will be a 'full' ora 'whole one."' (Tr., p.102, Ls.12-14.) 
1 All citations to "Tr." in this brief refer to the 221-page Transcript on Appeal, which 
includes transcripts of the August 5, 2013 and August 6, 2013 jury trial, the October 2, 
2013 motion for new trial hearing, and the October 9, 2013 sentencing hearing. 
(Tr., p.2.) All citations to other transcripts not included in the 221-page Transcript on 
Appeal will include the date of the hearing in the citation. 
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Sergeant Hildebrandt testified that he had reviewed the audio recordings of the 
two calls, that they were accurate recordings of the calls, and that he recognized 
Mr. Wyman's voice as one of the two voices on the calls. (Tr., p.109, L.8- p.111, L.7.) 
Deputy Mark Ellis of the Kootenai County Sheriff's Office also testified that he had 
reviewed the recordings, and he recognized the two voices on the recordings as 
Mr. Bradley and Mr. Wyman. (Tr., p.119, Ls.2-13.) 
Over Mr. Bradley's objection, the district court admitted the audio recordings into 
evidence and the State published them to the jury. (Tr., p.119, Ls.14-18, p.122, L.12 -
p.123, L.5.) During the first call, Mr. Wyman purportedly told Mr. Bradley, "I'm going to 
need a whole one." (State's Ex. 1, 00:18-00:21.) During the second call, Mr. Bradley 
and Mr. Wyman supposedly agreed to meet at a Pawn 1 store in about fifteen minutes. 
(State's Ex. 2, 00:33-00:46.) Mr. Bradley then purportedly asked Mr. Wyman, "Do you 
want a full?" (State's Ex. 2, 00:49-00:53.) Mr. Wyman replied, "Yeah." (State's Ex. 2, 
00:53-00:55.) 
Deputy Ellis testified that he met with Sergeant Hildebrandt and Mr. Wyman 
before going to the Pawn 1 and parking nearby. (Tr., p.115, L.6 - p.117, L.8.) About 
fifteen minutes later, he saw two patrol deputies initiate a traffic stop on a blue pickup 
truck and detain the driver, Mr. Bradley. (Tr., p.117, L.9 - p.118, L.11.) Deputy Ellis 
testified that he searched the truck and found a can with a fake bottom inside. 
(Tr., p.119, L.19 - p.120, L.3.) Upon opening the fake bottom, he found a plastic bag 
containing a white crystal substance that he believed to be methamphetamine. 
(Tr., p.120, Ls.6-9.) 
Annie Nord, the lab manager at the Idaho State Police Forensic Lab in 
Coeur d'Alene, testified that testing indicated that the crystal substance contained 
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methamphetamine. (Tr., p.139, Ls.5-1 
of the crystal substance was 
28.35 grams. (Tr., p.146, Ls.19-20.) 
145, Ls.10-18.) She also testified that the 
grams. (Tr., p.1 Ls.4-18.) An ounce is 
After the end of testimony, Mr. Bradley requested that the charges be dismissed 
for insufficient proof under Idaho Criminal Rule 29, the rule governing motions for a 
judgment of acquittal. (See Tr., p.151, L.23 - p.152, L.5.) Mr. Bradley essentially 
asserted that there was insufficient evidence of a sale or delivery, and that there was 
insufficient evidence that Mr. Bradley had represented the weight of the substance.2 
( See Tr., p.152, Ls.12-14; see also R., pp.96-99 (Mr. Bradley's arguments for why there 
was insufficient evidence); Tr., p.8, L.4 - p.10, L.5 (same).) The district court denied the 
oral motion for a judgment of acquittal. (Tr., p.152, Ls.10-20.) The jury later found 
Mr. Bradley guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine. (R., pp.171-72.) 
Mr. Bradley then filed a Motion for New Trial pursuant to I.C. §§ 19-2406(4 ), (5) 
and (6), on the grounds that the audio recordings were admitted contrary to the rules of 
evidence, hearsay was admitted contrary to the rules of evidence, the jury instructions 
did not accurately define the crime, and the verdict was not sustainable under the 
evidence presented. (R., pp.174-75.) The district court denied the motion for a new 
trial. (R., pp.183-02.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended a unified sentence of twelve 
years, with four years fixed, and Mr. Bradley recommended a unified sentence of six 
years, with the mandatory minimum of three years fixed. (R., pp.204-05.) The district 
2 Mr. Bradley told the district court that his arguments in favor of granting the motion for 
judgment of acquittal "are exactly the same as the [pre-trial] motion to dismiss." (See 
Tr., p.152, Ls.12-15.) The district court had denied the motion to dismiss after a 
hearing. (Tr., p.14, L.9 - p.15, L.8.) 
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imposed a unified sentence of twelve years, with the mandatory minimum of three 
fixed. (R., pp.205, 213-15.) 
Mr. Bradley filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's sentencing 
decision. (R., pp.207-08.) Mr. Bradley also filed a Motion for Stay of Sentence. 
(R., pp.211-12.) The district court then issued an Order Staying Execution of Sentence 
pending Mr. Bradley's appeal. (R., pp.216-17.) 
Mr. Bradley subsequently filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for a reduction 
of sentence. (R., p.218.) The district court denied the Rule 35 motion. (R., p.224.) On 
appeal, Mr. Bradley does not challenge the denial of the Rule 35 motion.3 
The then filed a Motion to Reconsider Stay of Execution of Sentence 
(R., p.239), as well as a Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider Stay of Execution of 
Sentence. (R., pp.225-27.) The district court then issued an Order Releasing 
Defendant. (R., p.240.) 
At the hearing on the State's motion to reconsider, the district court vacated the 
Order Staying Execution of Sentence and the Order Releasing Defendant. (R., pp.248-
51.) The district court then notified Mr. Bradley that he could file a new motion for stay 
of sentence with the district court or with the Idaho Supreme Court. (R., p.249.) 
Mr. Bradley filed a second motion for stay of execution of judgment with the 
district court. (See R., p.257.) The district court, with a new presiding judge, denied the 
second motion for stay. (R., pp.255-58.) 
3 The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the 
defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional 
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." 
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). "An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 
motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the 
presentation of new information." Id. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted the audio recordings of 
the telephone calls into evidence, because the State did not provide proper 
foundation to admit them? 
2. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Bradley's oral Idaho Criminal Rule 29 
motion for judgment of acquittal, because the evidence presented to the jury was 
insufficient to convict him of trafficking in methamphetamine? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
twelve years, with three years fixed, upon Mr. Bradley following his conviction for 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted The Audio Recordings Of The 
Telephone Calls Into Evidence, Because The State Did Not Provide Proper Foundation 
To Admit Them 
Mr. Bradley asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted 
the audio recordings of the telephone calls into evidence, because the State did not 
provide proper foundation to admit them. The State did not provide proper foundation to 
admit the recordings into evidence because it did not sufficiently authenticate them. 
The State did not sufficiently authenticate the recordings because it did not show they 
were complete and accurate representations of the telephone conversations. The State 
will be unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court's error in 
admitting the recordings into evidence is harmless. Mr. Bradley's conviction should 
therefore be vacated. 
Alternatively, the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Bradley's 
motion for a new trial, because the district court erred in deciding a question of law 
arising during the course of the trial, when it admitted the audio recordings of the 
telephone calls into evidence. Mr. Bradley is entitled to a new trial because the error 
affected a substantial right. 
A. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted The Audio Recordings 
Into Evidence 
Mr. Bradley objected to the admission of the audio recordings because proper 
foundation had not been laid for their admission. (Tr., p.136, Ls.1-15.) As Mr. Bradley's 
counsel explained, "No one was able to testify that either one of those exhibits 
completely, fairly, and accurately represented the entire conversation between those 
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people. All you had was enforcement officers saying they recognized 
That's it. They can't lay the foundation for the admission of those 
CDs." (Tr., p.136, Ls.4-10.) The district court found "there is sufficient foundation 
between the two officers to establish the authenticity and the completeness of the 
record," and overruled the objection. (Tr., p.137, Ls.2-8.) However, the State actually 
did not provide proper foundation to admit the recordings into evidence because it did 
not sufficiently authenticate them. 
1. Standard Of Review And Applicable Law 
"The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its 
judgment will reversed on appeal only when there has been an abuse of discretion." 
State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 34 (1997). "Whether evidence admitted by the trial court is 
supported by a proper foundation is reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard." 
Id. When a district court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate 
court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the district court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) whether the district court acted within the 
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to 
the specific choices before it, and (3) whether the district court reached its decision by 
an exercise of reason." State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989). 
Because the State contended that the audio recordings were of telephone 
conversations between Mr. Bradley and Mr. Wyman, the State had to provide proper 
foundation for their admission into evidence. See State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 15 (2013). 
Thus, the State had to authenticate the recordings. See id. The Idaho Rules of 
Evidence provide that: "The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition 
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the 
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matter in question is what its proponent claims." I.R. 901 (a). One of 
"authentication conforming with the requirements of this rule" is "[t]estimony of a witness 
with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be." I.R.E. 901 (b)(1 ). Another 
example is a telephone conversation "by evidence that a call was made to the number 
assigned at the time by the telephone company to a particular person . . . if . . . 
circumstances, including self-identification, show the person answering to be the one 
called." I.R.E. 901 (b )(6)(A). 
Idaho civil case law suggests that whether audio recordings were complete and 
accurate impacts whether the recordings have been sufficiently authenticated. See 
Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Const. & Trucking, Inc., 151 Idaho 761, 770-71 (2011); 
Alderson v. Bonner, 142 Idaho 733, 737-38 (Ct. App. 2006). This proposition accords 
with the approach taken by some of Idaho's neighboring jurisdictions with respect to 
authenticating audio recordings. For example, the Washington Supreme Court has 
outlined the following requirements for the admission of tape recordings: 
(1) It must be shown that the mechanical transcription device was capable 
of taking testimony. (2) It must be shown that the operator of the device 
was competent to operate the device. (3) The authenticity and correctness 
of the recording must be established. (4) It must be shown that changes, 
additions, or deletions have not been made. (5) The manner of 
preservation of the record must be shown. (6) Speakers must be 
identified. (7) It must be shown that the testimony elicited was freely and 
voluntarily made, without any kind of duress. 
State v. Smith, 540 P.2d 424, 428 (Wash. 1975) (quoting State v. Williams, 301 P.2d 
769, 772 (Wash. 1956)). Similar rules have been adopted by courts in Oregon, State v. 
Miller, 487 P.2d 1387, 1389-90 (Or. Ct. App. 1971) (applying the same seven 
requirements from Smith), and Utah, Chen v. Stewart, 123 P .3d 416, 426 (Utah 2005) 
("While a proponent may find it beneficial to demonstrate most, if not all, of the factors 
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discussed in State v. Smith, [540 P.2d 424, (\Nash. 1975)], he is not required to do 
so as long as the evidence is otheiwise sufficient.") 
2. The State Did Not Provide Proper Foundation To Admit The Audio 
Recordings Into Evidence, Because It Did Not Sufficiently Authenticate 
Them 
The State did not provide proper foundation to admit the audio recordings into 
evidence, because it did not sufficiently authenticate them. With the above standards 
from Idaho and neighboring jurisdictions in mind, the State did not sufficiently 
authenticate the recordings here because it did not show they were complete and 
accurate representations of the telephone conversations. Contrary to the district court's 
determination, the officers' testimony did not establish the accuracy and completeness 
of the recordings. Although Sergeant Hildebrandt testified that the recordings were 
accurate (Tr., p.109, Ls.20-23, p.110, L.25 - p.111, L.2), on cross examination he 
testified that he did not clearly hear the entirety of both sides of the phone conversations 
while they were going on. (Tr., p.113, L.18 - p.114, L.16.) Sergeant Hildebrandt stated, 
"I could hear part of what was being said on the other end of the line, but I couldn't hear 
every word." (Tr., p.113, Ls.20-21.) Additionally, while Sergeant Hildebrandt 
recognized Mr. Wyman's voice (Tr., p.111, Ls.6-7), he testified that he did not recognize 
the other voice, but the phone number called was identified as "Cecil" on Mr. Wyman's 
phone. (Tr., p.111, Ls.12-25.) 
Deputy Ellis testified that he recognized the two voices on the audio recordings 
as Mr. Bradley and Mr. Wyman, (Tr., p.119, Ls.2-13), and that he came to recognize 
Mr. Bradley's voice after speaking with him in the parking lot of the Pawn 1. (Tr., p.118, 
L.22 - p.119, L.1.) However, on cross examination, Deputy Ellis testified that he was in 
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an adjacent part of the jail during the first call, and that he was not at the jail all when 
call occurred. (Tr., p.127, Ls.5-16.) 
Thus, the State did not sufficiently authenticate the audio recordings because it 
did not show they were complete and accurate representations of the telephone 
conversations. See Harris, Inc., 151 Idaho at 770-71; Alderson, 142 Idaho at 737-38; 
see also Smith, 540 P.2d at 428 (holding that the accuracy and correctness of a tape 
recording must be established to admit the recording into evidence). While Sergeant 
Hildebrandt was present with Mr. Wyman during the calls, he testified that he did not 
clearly hear both sides of the conversations. (See Tr., p.113, L.18 - p.114, L.16.) 
Thus, Sergeant Hildebrandt's testimony did not establish that the recordings were 
accurate and complete, because it could not show "that additions, or deletions 
not Smith, 540 P.2d at 428. Because Sergeant Hildebrandt 
"couldn't hear every word" on the other end of the line (see Tr., p.113, Ls.21-22), he 
was unable to confirm that the recordings' representations of what was said on the other 
end of the line during the conversations was complete and accurate. 
Deputy EIiis's testimony also did not establish that the audio recordings were 
accurate and complete. He was not even present in the interview room for either call. 
(See Tr., p.127, Ls.5-16.) His testimony about identifying the voices on the recordings 
therefore did not establish that the recordings were complete and accurate 
representations, because it could not show "that changes, additions, or deletions have 
not been made" to either side of the conversations. See Smith, 540 P.2d at 428. 
Because Deputy Ellis was not present for the calls when they occurred, he had no way 
to know if any alterations had been made to the recordings. Thus, because the State 
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did that the recordings were complete and accurate representations, it did not 
sufficiently authenticate the recordings. 
Because the State did not sufficiently authenticate the audio recordings, it did not 
provide proper foundation to admit the recordings into evidence. Thus, the district court 
abused its discretion when it admitted the recordings into evidence. 
3. The State Will Be Unable To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That The 
District Court's Error In Admitting The Audio Recordings Is Harmless 
The State will be unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the district 
court's error in admitting the audio recordings is harmless. Once a defendant appealing 
from an objected-to error has shown that the error occurred, "the State shall have the 
burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010). 'To meet that burden, the State must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained." Joy, 155 Idaho at 11 (2013). 
To say that an error did not "contribute" to the ensuing verdict is not, of 
course, to say that the jury was totally unaware of that feature of the trial 
later held to have been erroneous.... To say that an error did not 
contribute to the verdict is, rather, to find that error unimportant in relation 
to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as 
revealed in the record. 
Id. (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991 ), overruled in part on other grounds 
by Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 n.4 (1991 )). 'Thus, an appellate court's inquiry 
'is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely 
have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was 
surely unattributable to the error."' Id. (quoting Sul/ivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 
(1993)) (emphasis in original). 
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Rather than being harmless, the district court's error in admitting the audio 
recordings into evidence here is The State will not be able to establish that 
the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because the admission of the 
recordings into evidence contributed to the verdict. The State's theory of the case was 
that Mr. Bradley "represented" that the weight of the substance was 28 grams or more 
pursuant to I.C. § 27-27328(c). (See Tr., p.95, Ls.15-24, p.96, L.14 - p.97, L.8.) In its 
closing argument, the State told the jury, "You've probably realized by now there is 
really only one issue in this particular case, and that issue [is] was there a 
representation here." (Tr., p.165, Ls.13-16.) 
The audio recordings were crucial to the State's case against Mr. Bradley, 
because they ostensibly provided evidence that Mr. Bradley represented the weight of 
the substance. The State invoked the recordings numerous times during its closing 
argument, telling the jury that the "whole one" and "full" statements from the recordings 
were two of the "three pieces of evidence to consider when you are thinking about 
whether or not there is the proof" that Mr. Bradley represented the weight. ( See 
Tr., p.168, L.16 - p.169, L.13.) Regarding the recording of the second call, the State 
told the jury, "I'm sure you will probably want to listen to this again." (Tr., p.168, L.21.) 
According to the State, the second call contained Mr. Bradley's representation, and the 
first call provided corroboration. (Tr., p.168, L.18 - p.169, L.13.) Because the 
recordings were crucial to the State's case, it cannot be said that the erroneous 
admission of the recordings "did not contribute to the verdict obtained." See Joy, 155 
Idaho at 11. Thus, the State will be unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
district court's error in admitting the recordings is harmless. 
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The district court 
and the will 
its 
unable to 
when it admitted the audio recordings into 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
district court's error in admitting the recordings is harmless. Mr. Bradley's conviction 
should be vacated. 
8. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Bradley's Motion For 
A New Trial 
After the trial, Mr. Bradley filed a Motion for New Trial pursuant to I.C. §§ 19-
2406(4 ), (5) and (6) on four grounds, the relevant ground here being that the audio 
recordings were admitted contrary to the rules of evidence. (R., pp.174-75.) The 
district court found "that the State laid a proper foundation that the recorded phone calls 
represented a true and accurate depiction of the recorded conversations." (R., p.190.) 
Thus, the district court concluded "that Defendant is not entitled to a new trial based 
upon the admission of the recordings." (R., p.190.) However, the district court abused 
its discretion when it denied Mr. Bradley's motion for a new trial, because the district 
court actually erred in deciding a question of law arising during the course of the trial 
when it admitted the audio recordings of the telephone calls into evidence. The district 
court's error entitles Mr. Bradley to a new trial, because the error affected a 
substantial right. 
1. Standard Of Review And Applicable Law 
An appellate court reviews a denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 72 (2011 ). "Because a motion for new trial 
involves mixed questions of law and fact, an abuse of discretion will be found if the trial 
court's findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence or if the trial court does 
not correctly apply the law." Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). 
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Idaho Code § 19-2406 "sets forth the only grounds permitting the grant of a new 
trial and, therefore, limits instances in which the trial discretion may be 
exercised." State v. Cantu, 129 Idaho 673, 674 (1997). While Idaho Criminal Rule 34 
allows a trial court to grant a new trial "if required in the interest of justice," the rule 
"simply states the standard that the trial court must apply when it considers the statutory 
grounds." Id. Among the statutory grounds for the grant of the new trial are "[w]hen the 
court has misdirected the jury in a matter of law, or has erred in the decision of any 
question of law arising during the course of the trial." I.C. § 19-2406(5). 
2. The District Court Erred In Deciding A Question Of Law Arising During the 
Course Of The Trial When It Admitted The Audio Recordings Into 
Evidence, Because The State Did !'Jot Provide Proper Foundation To 
Admit Them 
Here, the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Bradley's motion 
for a new trial, because the district court erred in deciding a question of law arising 
during the course of the trial when it admitted the audio recordings of the telephone 
calls into evidence. As explained above, the district court abused its discretion when it 
admitted the recordings into evidence, because the State did not provide proper 
foundation to admit them. Mr. Bradley incorporates his above discussion herein, which 
shows that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted the recordings into 
evidence. Thus, the district court erred in deciding this question of law arising during 
the course of the trial. See I.C. § 19-2406(5). 
3. Mr. Bradley Is Entitled To A New Trial Because The District Court's Error 
Affected A Substantial Right 
The district court's error entitles Mr. Bradley to a new trial, because the error 
affected a substantial right. "In the case of an incorrect ruling regarding the admission 
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of evidence, a new trial is merited only if the error a substantial right of one of the 
parties." Evans v. State, 135 Idaho 422, 426 (Ct App. 2001) (citing I.C.R. 61; Highland 
Enters., Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 345 (1999)). The analysis for whether an error 
has affected a substantial right is closely related to the analysis for harmless error: "The 
determination of whether a substantial right has been affected hinges on whether it 
appears from the record that the error contributed to the verdict." State v. Rupp, 118 
Idaho 17, 19 (Ct. App. 1990) (quoting State v. Boehner, 114 Idaho 311, 315 
(Ct. App. 1988)). 
As discussed above, the audio recordings were crucial to the State's case 
against Mr. Bradley, and it cannot be said that the error "did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained." See Joy, 155 Idaho at 11. Thus, the district court's error affected a 
substantial right. See Rupp, 118 Idaho at 19. Mr. Bradley is therefore entitled to a 
new trial. 
In sum, because the district court erred in deciding a question of law arising 
during the course of the trial, when it admitted the audio recordings into evidence, the 
district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Bradley's motion for a new trial. 
The district court's error entitles Mr. Bradley to a new trial, because the error affected a 
substantial right. Mr. Bradley's conviction should be vacated and his case should be 
remanded to the district court for a new trial. 
II. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Bradley's Oral Idaho Criminal Rule 29 
Motion For Judgment Of Acquittal, Because The Evidence Presented To The Jury Was 
Insufficient To Convict Him Of Trafficking In Methamphetamine 
Mr. Bradley asserts that the district court erred when it denied his oral Idaho 
Criminal Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, because the evidence presented to 
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jury was insufficient to convict him of trafficking in methamphetamine. 
cou denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal should be 
Mr. Bradley's conviction should be vacated. 
district 
and 
The relevant ground for Mr. Bradley's motion for judgment of acquittal was that 
there was insufficient evidence that Mr. Bradley had represented the weight of the 
substance. (See Tr., p.152, Ls.12-14; see a/so R., pp.96-99 (Mr. Bradley's arguments 
for why there was insufficient evidence); Tr., p.8, L.4 p.10, L.5 (same).) The district 
court denied the motion for judgment of acquittal. (Tr., p.152, Ls.10-20.) However, the 
evidence presented to the jury was actually insufficient to convict Mr. Bradley of 
trafficking in methamphetamine. 
A. Standard Of Review And Applicable Law 
The standard of review for the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal "is 
whether there was substantial evidence upon which a trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 
679, 684 (2004 ). Substantial evidence exists when "a reasonable mind could conclude 
that a defendant's guilt as to such material evidence of the offense was proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The appellate court 
conducts an independent review of the record to determine if there is no evidence upon 
which a guilty verdict could be based. Id. Where there is competent but conflicting 
evidence to sustain the verdict, the appellate court may not reweigh that evidence or 
disturb the verdict. Id. The appellate court will take all reasonable inferences in favor of 
the prosecution. Id. 
The methamphetamine trafficking provision of the trafficking statute under which 
Mr. Bradley was charged provides that: 
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Any person who knowingly delivers, or brings into this state, or who is 
knowingly in actual or constructive possession of, twenty-eight (28) grams 
or more of methamphetamine or amphetamine or of any mixture or 
substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine or 
amphetamine is guilty of a felony, which felony shall be known as 
"trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine." 
I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(4 ). The trafficking statute also states that, "For the purposes 
of subsections (a) and (b) of this section the weight of the controlled substance as 
represented by the person selling or delivering it is determinative if the weight as 
represented is greater than the actual weight of the controlled substance." I.C. § 37-
27328(c). 
B. The Evidence Was Insufficient To Support The Jury's Verdict, Because There 
Was No Substantial Evidence Upon Which The Jury Could Have Found The 
Essential Element Of Weight Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
Mr. Bradley asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's 
verdict. Specifically, there was no substantial evidence upon which the jury could have 
found the essential element of the weight of the substance beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The substance weighed 27.63 grams (Tr., p.146, Ls.4-18), less than the 28 grams 
generally required by the trafficking statute. See I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(4). Thus, to prove 
the essential element of the weight of the substance, the State had to show under § 37-
2732B( c) that Mr. Bradley represented that the weight was 28 grams or more. 
Whether Mr. Bradley "represented" the weight of the substance within the 
meaning of the trafficking statute is an issue of statutory interpretation. Cf. State v. 
Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389 (Ct. App. 2000).4 The interpretation of a statute is a 
4 In Escobar, the Idaho Court of Appeals interpreted I.C. § 37-2732B(c) as "mak[ing] no 
distinction between offenses that involve a completed delivery and those that do not." 
Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389. According to the Court, "under subsections [(a)(4)] and (c), 
a defendant may be convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine if the defendant 
represented the weight of the delivered substance to be twenty-eight grams or more, 
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question of law, over which appellate courts free review. State v. Hart, 135 
Idaho (2001 ). The Idaho Supreme Court has outlined the following rules of 
statutory interpretation. "The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words 
of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and 
the statute must be construed as a whole." Verska v. Saint Alp hons us Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 
151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). "If the statute is not 
ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written."5 Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). "We have consistently held that where statutory 
language is unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should not be 
consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature." Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 'The asserted purpose for enacting the legislation 
cannot modify its plain meaning." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Appellate 
courts do not have authority to revise or void "an unambiguous statute on the ground 
that it is patently absurd or would produce absurd results when construed as written." 
Id. at 896. "If the statute as written is socially or otherwise unsound, the power to 
correct it is legislative, not judicial." Id. at 893 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Title 37 of the Idaho Code does not define "represented." See I.C. § 37-2701. 
This does not mean Section 37-2732B(c) is ambiguous, because the plain, usual, and 
ordinary meaning of "represented" may be gleaned from other sources. The most 
relevant definition of "representation" from the latest edition of Black's Law Dictionary 
provides that a "representation" is "[a] presentation of fact-either by words or by 
even if the actual weight was less." Id. The defendant in Escobar was charged under 
the methamphetamine trafficking provision of the trafficking statute before it was 
renumbered to I.C. § 27-2732B(a)(4). Id. at 388 n.1. 
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conduct-made to induce someone to to into a contract; esp., the 
manifestation to another that a fact, including a state of mind, " Representation, 
Black's Law Dictionary (9 th ed. 2009). The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary's most 
relevant definition of "represent" provides that tt1e term means "to describe as having a 
specified character or quality." Represent, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/represent (last accessed on Aug. 8, 2014.) 
Applying the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of "represented" from the above 
sources shows that there was insufficient evidence on the weight element because 
Mr. Bradley did not represent the weight of the substance. As explained above in Part I 
of the Argument, the district court abused its discretion when it admitted the audio 
recordings of the telephone calls into evidence, because the State did not provide 
proper foundation to admit them. Without the recordings, the State would have had no 
evidence that Mr. Bradley represented anything to Mr. Wyman, much less than he 
represented the weight of the substance. 
Even if the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the audio 
recordings into evidence, there was insufficient evidence on the weight element. Under 
the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of "represented," Mr. Bradley did not represent 
the weight of the evidence. Mr. Bradley never presented as fact, through his words or 
conduct, that the substance weighed an ounce (which equals 28.35 grams). While 
there was testimony from Sergeant Hildebrandt on how cover words were often used 
during drug deals in general (Tr., p.102, Ls.7-17), there was no testimony showing that 
Mr. Bradley or Mr. Wyman understood that a "full" or a "whole one" meant an ounce. 
5 "A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable 
construction. An unambiguous statute would have only one reasonable interpretation." 
Verska, 151 Idaho at 896 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Further, Mr. Bradley's actions in going to the agreed-upon location with the 
substance in his truck did not represent the weight of the substance. At 
Mr. Bradley's conduct represented that he had the substance in his possession, but the 
conduct did not present or describe its weight. As Mr. Bradley's counsel put it at the 
hearing on the pretrial motion to dismiss,6 "Maybe if you are an Iron Man, lifting weights, 
and you are grunting, you are representing that it is heavy, but you are not representing 
exactly how heavy it is. You are not going to represent a weight by your actions." 
(Tr., p.13, Ls.14-17.) In short, Mr. Bradley did not represent the weight of the 
substance. Thus, there was insufficient evidence on the weight element to convict. 
Because there was no substantial evidence upon which the jury could have 
found the essential element of the weight of the substance beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. The district court therefore 
erred when it denied Mr. Bradley's Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. The district 
court's denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal should be reversed and 
Mr. Bradley's conviction should be vacated. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Twelve 
Years, With Three Years Fixed, Following Mr. Bradley's Conviction For Trafficking 
In Methamphetamine 
Mr. Bradley asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed 
his unified sentence of twelve years, with three years fixed, because the indeterminate 
portion of the sentence is excessive. Mr. Bradley does not challenge the fixed portion of 
6 Mr. Bradley's counsel incorporated this line of reasoning into his arguments on the 
Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, because he told the district court that his 
arguments in favor of granting the motion for judgment of acquittal "are exactly the 
same as the motion to dismiss." (See Tr., p.152, Ls.12-15.) 
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his sentence, because the applicable mandatory minimum is three I.C. § 37-
2732B(a)(4)(A). The district court should have imposed an indeterminate 
portion of three years, as Mr. Bradley requested. 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively 
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record 
giving "due regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence." State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Mr. Bradley does not allege that his sentence exceeds the 
statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Bradley 
must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive 
considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of criminal 
punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public 
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrongdoing. Id. An appellate court, "[w]hen reviewing the length of a sentence ... 
consider[sJ the defendant's entire sentence." State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 
(2007). The reviewing court will "presume that the fixed portion of the sentence will be 
the defendant's probable term of confinement." Id. 
Mr. Bradley submits that, because the district court did not give adequate 
consideration to mitigating factors, the indeterminate portion of his sentence is 
excessive considering any view of the facts. Specifically, the district court did not 
adequately consider Mr. Bradley's substance abuse problems. The Idaho Supreme 
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rt has recognized substance abuse as a mitigating factor in cases where it found a 
to be excessive. See, e.g., State v. Nice, 1 Idaho 89, 91 (1 
Mr. Bradley has been diagnosed with alcohol abuse and amphetamine dependence. 
(PSI, p.25.) He started using alcohol when he was fourteen years old, and 
amphetamines when he was thirty-two. (Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.26.) 
He reported using alcohol about twice a month, but would consume twelve beers in a 
sitting. (PSI, p.26.) He reported using methamphetamine about twice a week. (PSI, 
p.26.) Many of the entries in Mr. Bradley's criminal history, such as his six DUls, are 
related to his substance abuse problems. (See PSI, pp.5-15, 22.) However, 
Mr. Bradley now recognizes that, as he told the district court during the sentencing 
hearing, he is "in fact an alcoholic and a drug addict." (Tr., p.216, Ls.6-8.) Mr. Bradley 
now desires rehabilitation to help him avoid the poor choices he has made. (Tr., p.216, 
L.13 p.217, L.6.) Adequate consideration of Mr. Bradley's substance abuse problems 
should have led to a lesser indeterminate portion of the sentence. 
The district court also did not adequately consider Mr. Bradley's difficult 
childhood. Mr. Bradley's first memories of his parents together involved the two of them 
drinking, and a lot of arguing. (PSI, p.16.) He described his father as a "bad alcoholic." 
(PSI, p.16.) When Mr. Bradley was twelve years old, his father left and was murdered 
in Alaska. (PSI, p.16.) His mother continued to drink while she took care of Mr. Bradley 
and his brother. (PSI, p.16.) Adequate consideration of Mr. Bradley's difficult childhood 
should have led to a lesser indeterminate portion of the sentence. 
Perhaps most importantly, the district court did not give adequate consideration 
to how, despite his substance abuse problems and difficult childhood, Mr. Bradley 
contributes in many ways to his family and community. Jessica Bolton, Mr. Bradley's 
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girlfriend, reported that Mr. Bradley "will do anything to help anyone." (Sealed 
p.138.)7 His friends wrote the district court letters describing how Mr. Bradley is "a 
loving attentive father and son and a great friend" (Sealed Exs., p.139), "a very caring 
father" and "a very unselfish friend with a great deal of consideration for others" (Sealed 
Exs., p.140) and "a hard worker and willing to go the extra mile" (Sealed Exs., p.141 ). 
Virginia Morgan, a sixty-seven-year-old disabled widow, reported that Mr. Bradley "has 
always been there" when she asked for his help. (Sealed Exs., p.142.) 
Mr. Bradley's friends and family describe him as a good man who has made 
mistakes, and is now willing to take responsibility for and learn from those mistakes. 
His mother, Donna Ray Bradley, stated that Mr. Bradley "is a person of good moral 
character. . . . I have seen go through ups and downs, but all the while I have been 
convinced that is a decent person at the core." (Sealed Exs., p.137 (emphasis in 
original).) Ms. Bradley wrote, "Dwayne has made mistakes, and he is incredibly 
remorseful, and is willing to do whatever it takes to make preparations, financially and 
emotionally, if possible." (Sealed Exs., p.137 (emphases in original).) Similarly, 
Ms. Bolton stated that "Dwayne is not a threat to the public or a flight risk and if given 
the chance he will prove that to you with his actions from here on out." (Sealed Exs., 
p.138.) One of Mr. Bradley's friends wrote that "I truly believe with some supervision, a 
little help, and the desire I believe Dwayne has to be a good father and productive 
member of society that he will make every effort to get his life back on track." (Sealed 
Exs., p.139.) 
Mr. Bradley would not have received such support from his friends and family if 
he did not enrich their lives. Despite his mistakes, Mr. Bradley contributes in many 
7 All citations to the Sealed Exhibits refer to the 142-page PDF document. 
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his family and community. Adequate consideration of those contributions 
in a 
Because the district court did not adequately consider the above mitigating 
factors, the indeterminate portion of Mr. Bradley's sentence is excessive considering 
any view of the facts. Thus, Mr. Olson submits that the district court abused its 
discretion when it imposed the unified sentence of twelve years, with three years fixed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. Bradley respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
his conviction. Alternatively, Mr. Bradley respectfully requests that this Court vacate his 
conviction and remand his case for a new trial. Alternatively, Mr. Bradley respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the district court's denial of the motion for judgment of 
acquittal and vacate his conviction. Alternatively, Mr. Bradley respectfully requests that 
this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 1 fh day of August, 2014. 
BEN P. MCGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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